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We consider biological individuality in terms of information theoretic and graphical princi-
ples. Our purpose is to extract through an algorithmic decomposition system-environment
boundaries supporting individuality. We infer or detect evolved individuals rather than as-
sume that they exist. Given a set of consistent measurements over time, we discover a coarse-
grained or quantized description on a system, inducing partitions (which can be nested).
Legitimate individual partitions will propagate information from the past into the future,
whereas spurious aggregations will not. Individuals are therefore deVned in terms of ongo-
ing, bounded information processing units rather than lists of static features or conventional
replication-based deVnitions which tend to fail in the case of cultural change. One virtue of
this approach is that it could expand the scope of what we consider adaptive or biological
phenomena, particularly in the microscopic and macroscopic regimes of molecular and social
phenomena.
Keywords: Shannon information, mutual information, information decomposition, shared
information, synergy, adaptation, evolution, control
The architecture of individuality
From the perspective of physics and chemistry, biological life is surprising. There is no physical or chem-
ical theory from which we can derive biology, and yet if we break down any biological system into its
elementary constituents there is no chemistry or physics that remains unaccounted for (Gell-Mann, 1995).
The fact that physics and chemistry are universal – ongoing in stars, solar systems and galaxies – whereas
to the best of our knowledge biology is exclusively terrestrial, supports the view that life is physically
emergent and perhaps unique. This stands in contrast to the universality of chemical phenomena which
can be derived from quantum mechanical considerations in fundamental physics, even when this proves
to be computationally cumbersome or intractable (Defranceschi and Le Bris, 2000, Schaefer, 2004). The
asymmetry in what can be gleaned from working down towards ever more elementary constituents ver-
sus working up through levels of aggregation is captured in the terms reductionism and emergence. It is
the emergent property of biology –which implies mechanistic explanatory gaps between biochemistry and
cell biology, cell biology and individuals, and individuals and societies – that has proven so challenging.
1
The emergence of individuals in particular is one of those features of biology that has attracted consider-
able attention, and forms the basis of many areas of specialized biological knowledge, from taxonomy and
cladistics through to physiology, behavior, and ecology (Clarke, 2011, Wilson, 2013).
It is almost inconceivable for us to imagine a biological science without a concept of individuality. After
all, how could we speak about metabolism, behavior or the genome without Vrst establishing a unit
or container of observation and measurement? Even Schrödinger in his prescient book, What is Life?
(Schrödinger, 2012), that sought to explore the persistence of biological phenotypes of organisms – or
even features of ecosystems – through the lens of elementary and universal physical underpinnings, made
strong prior assumptions about the reality of individual organisms:
“What degree of permanence do we encounter in hereditary properties and what must we therefore at-
tribute to the material structures which carry them? The answer to this can really be given without any
special investigation. The mere fact that we speak of hereditary properties indicates that we recognize
the permanence to be of the almost absolute. For we must not forget that what is passed on by the parent
to the child is not just this or that peculiarity, a hooked nose, short Vngers, a tendency to rheumatism,
haemophilia, dichromasy, etc. Such features we may conveniently select for studying the laws of heredity.
But actually it is the whole (four- dimensional) pattern of the phenotype, all the visible and manifest na-
ture of the individual, which is reproduced without appreciable change for generations, permanent within
centuries – though not within tens of thousands of years – and borne at each transmission by the ma-
terial in a structure of the nuclei of the two cells which unite to form the fertilized egg cell. That is a
marvel.”
It is clear that Schrödinger did not set out to derive the individual from fundamental physics, but to recon-
cile existing and rather traditional conceptions of individuality (essentially the individual as synonymous
with the observable organism) with the new physics of quantum mechanics.
In this respect Schrödinger was adopting a typically reductionist perspective, explaining features of bi-
ological science through Vrst principles of physics (Weinberg, 1995). In Schrödinger’s case, the physical
feature of greatest importance to biology was the long-lived covalent bond. But for many reasons this line
of approach has failed to deliver the deep and unifying insights based on physics (Anderson, 1972), from
which powerful biological ideas – such as adaptation or individuality – might be derived (Dupre, 2009,
Keller, 2009).
The question that we seek to address in this chapter is more modest. We are not asking how biology
emerges from physics and chemistry (Rasmussen et al., 2004), but how we might go about identifying
individuals through an automatic procedure by tracking the emergence of new spatial and temporal ag-
gregations and their coordinated and adaptive properties. We propose that all evolutionary processes
must leave tell-tale signatures of coordinated patterns of activity among putatively unrelated processes
– that these coordinated behaviors are frequently recognized as a form of individuality (for a synoptic
treatment of these see (Clarke, 2011)). SigniVcantly elevated coordination is a feature of multicellular or-
ganisms as well as microbes and loosely-bound ecological assemblages such as microbial mats. In an ideal
case, visitors to an exoplanet would have a procedure for identifying individuals based on a quantitative
survey with minimal prior knowledge of the type of life forms that they expect to encounter. Individuality
is therefore a signature of life.
We suggest that a productive research program in individuality should allow a-priori for the possibility
of multiple degrees of individuality at all levels of biological organization. This is in contrast to assigning
individuality to a single level or object – such as replicating cells or organisms – and then applying post hoc
biological deVnitions such as sequestered germ cells, vertical transmission of genetic material, a common
pool of metabolic free energy, or coordinated immune responses. It is not that these features are not
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eUective criteria when we have signiVcant prior knowledge of a system. It is that they are often derivative
of the space-time properties that support individuals and fail to apply at super-organismal levels.
We further propose that a desirable property for a model of individuality is that it will be able to account
for the hierarchical organization of life into nested trophic and functional levels – multiple parallel levels
of individuality. We take this position to be related to the recent suggestion of (Rieppel, 2013) where he
argues for individuals based on hierarchical complexes of homeostatic properties.
Our technical objective is to allow researchers to extract natural levels from dynamical systems, determin-
ing – through a principled, algorithmic decomposition – provisional system-environment boundaries, and
then measuring and quantifying each subsystem’s degree of individuality. The extent to which we Vnd
evidence of individuality becomes a measure of the action of an evolutionary or adaptive process.
The approach is initiated with microscopic measurements of some extended dynamical system as sug-
gested in the abstract. This could be a vector of chemical concentrations over time, the abundance of
various cell types, or the probabilities of observing dependable behaviors. These provide a list of con-
sistent measurements on a number of traits of possible relevance to discerning individuality within parts
of a system over the course of time. The measurements are then grouped in a principled way, coarse-
grained or quantized into a smaller number of partitions (which can be nested). Some of these partitions
will continue to behave in a coordinated fashion over characteristic intervals of time. If they do so we
have grounds to believe in the value of a given partition. If not then we will have incorrectly grouped
observations or there is no coordinated behavior to detect. DiUerences in the rates of change of partitions
will provide evidence of functional separations including organism-environment boundaries – organisms
will typically change quickly relative to their environments.
These “natural” time and space scales should reveal clues about the the mechanisms driving their consol-
idation into individuals (Flack, 2012, Flack et al., 2013). The formal basis for this approach to aggregation
comes from information theory, and throughout this paper we assume that individuals are best thought
of in terms of dynamical proccesses and not as stationary objects. In this respect our approach might
reasonably be framed through the lens of “process philosophy” (Rescher, 2007) which makes the elucida-
tion of the dynamical and coupled properties of natural phenomena the primary explanatory challenge.
From the perspective of “process philosophy” the tendency of starting with objects and then listing their
properties – “substance metaphysics” – places the cart before the horse.
The biological individual
In biology the canonical individual is often some form of replicator (Wilson, 2013) – either a single bio-
logical organism developed from a fertilized egg, with individuality residing at the phenotypic level (see
(Dawkins, 1983)), or asexual microbes or clonal organisms for whom individuality is deVned based on
shared genetic ancestry (Hughes, 1989). This pervasive replicator assumption has served as the starting
point for theorizing about what an individual is in a broad class of studies. As a result, three widely ac-
cepted properties of biological individuals include (1) they can increase in relative frequency exploiting a
source of metabolic free energy, (2) they respond adaptively to their environments, and (3) they are char-
acterized by tightly coordinated relationships (chemical, physiological, computational) among their parts.
Note that none of these properties require that the individual is a single organism. Cells and even societies
can possess all deVning features, as a number of authors have recognized, particularly in connection to a
variety of mutualisms (Gilbert et al., 2012).
One problem with this approach is that the environment or context of the candidate individual is often
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neglected, and more often than not, this is treated as nothing other than all parts of the larger ecological
context that are not members of the coordinated set comprising the individual. We argue that without
a rigorous deVnition of the environment it is very diXcult and likely impossible to speak consistently of
individuals. This is analogous to Vgure-ground separation in gestalt psychology or computer vision. The
background of an image carries as much if not more information than the object, and the challenge is to
separate the two rather than assume that they are already distinct and independent.
In summary, almost all deVnitions of individuality start from an assumption of set members (individual)
and a set complement (environment). These are articulated in diUerent ways in the various Velds, in-
cluding: (1) as an immunological concept pertaining to the idea of self and non-self (Pradeu, 2012), (2)
as a temporal aggregate encoding a common past separable or independent from the past of other ag-
gregates (ontogenetic or phylogenetic) (Rieppel, 2013) (3) as a spatially bounded collection of metabolic
reactions insulated by a membrane from reactions in the environment (Rasmussen et al., 2004) , and (4)
as a unit of selection and evolutionary change (Buss, 1987, Hughes, 1989, Szathmáry and Smith, 1997a,
Callcott and Sterelny, 2011). Our goal is to discover dynamical set members and their complement.
Challenges to conceptualizing individuality
A useful exercise in thinking about the pros and cons of one current biological view of individuality (see
also, (Santelices, 1999)) is to consider objects or processes that do not always get classiVed as individuals,
as these can reveal hidden assumptions informing our intuitions and judgement.
Work on the social insects and on a number of plant, fungal and prokaryotic species has made clear a
few of the pitfalls of this “intuitive” approach to the deVnition of individual (Gow et al., 2008, Esser et al.,
2001). What these taxa demonstrate is that when we speak of individuals we are often talking about
individuality at multiple organizational levels – physically distinct ants, but also aggregates of individual
ants forming colonies, and they are not always physically contiguous. For example, the majority of worker
ants do not replicate, the colony as whole does not replicate, but replication is a feature of the system,
and, importantly, the combination of replication by some colony members, with the persistence (and hard
work) of other colony members, allows the colony as a whole to persist and adapt in response to changes
in the environment.
Viruses occupy a sort of twilight zone in biology. Declared by some non-living, and treated by most
as a rather pathetic minimal limit of life, viruses constitute obligate translational parasites, incapable of
completing their life cycles without Vrst appropriating the protein synthesis machinery of a host cell. The
viral capsid contains a largely inert genome responsible for encoding only a small fraction of the proteins
required for synthesizing a new virus genome and the capsid required for egressing from the infected
cell. The virus exists only within the larger dynamical, regulatory network of the cell. Hence the virus
– understood as the active parasitic agent – is comprised largely of host encoded factors. And yet it can
replicate, adapt and has a persistent identity that distinguishes it from its environment – despite the fact
it relies on its environment for replicating. We might say that the virus is one small part of a chimerical
individual (Krakauer and Zanotto, 2006).
A way forward
One possibility is that ant colonies and viruses are only nominally individual - a property of our human
perception. But if they are real in a deeper physical sense then how might we determine this? We suggest
that one way forward lies in allowing a priori for the possibility of degrees of individuality at diUerent
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levels of biological organization rather than restricting ourselves to the unique individuality of the organ-
ism. In other words, we do not assume that individuality is binary but allow it to be continuous, with
the surprising implication that some processes possess greater individuality than others. We also allow
individuality to be nested such that individuals can contain individuals. These two properties are well
accepted in biology. Organelles (as individuals) are nested within cells (also individuals), and some cells
act more independently than others – blood cells versus neurons. Nevertheless these desirable properties
have not formed the basis for a theory that allows us to identify individuals when we have only limited
prior knowledge of a system.
Quantifying individuality
We seek a means of extracting sets of causally correlated observations reWecting coordinated biological
activity through an automated or algorithmic procedure. Presented with a set of time varying measure-
ments, we follow a procedure for partitioning these into sets of variables that represent some plausible
deVnition of individuality based on non-trivial temporal coherence. We provide a procedure that is suf-
Vciently tolerant of variation in underlying mechanism such that a variety of “biological individuality”
concepts are respected.
For static structures, there already exist reasonable deVnitions of modularity. Many of these deVnitions are
associated with procedures for partitioning microscopic data into tightly bound groups, such as commu-
nities. For example, in networks quantitative modularity measures seek partitions of nodes and edges into
sets that are statistically over-represented in data when compared to an appropriate null model (Newman,
2006). Unlike notions of individuality, modules are usually derived from static or equilibrium systems.
For an individual, we desire a dynamical system in order to include not only a separability concept (for
say self non-self distinctions) but also an historical dimension and a mechanism of self-preservation or
long-term stability in the sense of Schrödinger .
Developmental deVnitions of modularity, such as those applied to limb formation, or the appearance of
body segments, also provide a window into individuality (Davidson and Swalla., 2004) but they have not
been presented in the form of algorithmic methods for automated extraction and identiVcation as they
have in network science (Newman, 2010). In this paper we are restricting ourselves to these “automated”
or “algorithmic” procedures based on a belief in the value of mechanizing a concept and implementing it
on a suitable programmable machine. In this respect we are following the mathematician and computer
scientist, Alan Turing’s approach to deVning computation in terms of Turing machines operating on
Turing tapes (Turing, 1937). This is an operational or instrumental approach in which a concept such as
computation or individuality, comes to be understood in terms of a procedure with well deVned input and
output properties. One of Turing’s epistemological innovations was to replace the somewhat contentious
library of competing deVnitions of computationwith one very general formalism of conceptually synthetic
value and also of utilitarian value (this paper was written on a jazzed-up Turing machine).
The origin of information
A brief foray into the origin of the concept of information is required to understand the basis for the
approach we develop for quantifying the degree of individuality a system exhibits.
The roots of the information theoretic interpretation of entropy lie in the physical theory of thermody-
namics and the formal deVnition of work introduced by Clausius in the 1860s (see (Muller, 2007) for an
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introduction to this history). Work (displacement of a physical system) is produced by transferring ther-
mal energy from one body to another (heat). Entropy captures, or measures, the loss in temperature over
the range of motion of the working body. In other words, entropy measures the energy lost from the total
available energy available for performing work. The insights of Clausius were formalized and placed in a
mathematical framework by Gibbs in 1876.
In 1877 Boltzmann provided an alternative interpretation of entropy in his kinetic theory of gases as a
measure of the potential disorder in a system. This deVnition no longer emphasizes energy dissipated
through work but the number of unobservable conVgurations (microstates) of a system, e.g. particle
velocities consistent with an observable measurement (macrostate), e.g. temperature. These deVnitions of
entropy are closely related as Boltzmann entropy increases following the loss of energy available for work
attendant upon the collision of particles in motion during heat Wow. There are many diUerent microscopic
conVgurations of individual particles compatible with the same macroscopic measurement, only a few of
which are useful.
In 1948, encouraged by John von Neumann, Claude Shannon used the thermodynamical term entropy to
capture the information capacity of a communication channel. A string of a given length (macrostate) is
compatible with a large number of diUerent sequences of symbols (microstates). A target word will be
disordered during transmission in proportion to the noise in a channel. If there were no noise, each and
every microstate could be resolved and the entropy would deVne an upper limit on the number of signals
that could be transmitted. The study of the maximum number of states that can be transmitted from one
point to another across a channel, in the face of noise and when eXciently encoded is called information
theory.
Shannon did not describe entropy in terms of heat Wow and work, but information shared through a
channel transmitted from a signaler to a receiver (Shannon, 1948). The power of information theory
derives in part from the incredible generality of Shannon’s scheme. The signaler can be a phone in
Madison and the receiver a phone in Madrid, or the signaler can be a parent and the receiver its oUspring.
For phones the channel is a Vber-optic cable and the signal pulses of light. For organisms the channel
is the germ line and the signal the sequence of DNA or RNA polynucleotides in the genome. Increasing
entropy for a phone-call corresponds to the loss or disruption of light-pulses, whereas increasing entropy
during inheritance corresponds to mutation or developmental noise. The same scheme can be applied to
development, in which case the signaler is an organism in the past and the receiver the same organism
in the future. One way in which we might check that we are dealing with the same organism is that the
information transmitted forward in time is close to maximal.
In its simplest form, Shannon made use of the following formal measures when deVning information.
The entropy H of a random variable S measures the uncertainty or information of the states that it can
adopt:
H(S) = −
∑
i
P (si) log2 P (si)
where si are the possible values of the state and P (si) the probabilities of these states. For a coin there
would be two possible values for S, heads and tails, and the values of these states for a fair coin would
be the probability 0.5, yielding a metric entropy value of 1. Deviation from a fair coin corresponds to a
reduction in information, as in the limit of bias where only one side of the coin is favored, the outcome is
known in advance and any toss of the coin is perfectly predictable. This produces an entropy value of 0.
Hence information is minimized when predictability is maximized.
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To capture the communication value of information Shannon introduced a signaler and receiver struc-
ture, which is now typically described using two random variables S and R. The maximum information
transmitted between signaller and receiver is given by the Mutual Information (I). The I can be written
in several diUerent forms. One intuitive expression is:
I(S;R) = H(S) +H(R)−H(S,R)
Where H(S) and H(R) are the entropies of the signals, and H(S;R) the joint entropy of the two vari-
ables,
H(S;R) = −
∑
i
∑
j
P (si, rj) log2 P (si, rj)
The joint entropy is at a maximum when there is no relationship between the S and R variables. The
I is therefore high when the information in S and R are high and they are strongly coupled in their
values (H(S;R) is low). The I measures the information shared between S and R over a communication
channel because the only source of structure in R is assumed to come from S.
Another popular way of writing I is,
I(S;R) = H(R)−H(R|S)
whereH(S|R) is the conditional entropy of R or the amount of information in R that is not in S. Hence
if all the information in R comes from S thenH(R|S) will be zero, and I(S;R) = H(R).
These measures capture a maximum of shared information and provide statistics for an informational
theory of the individual.
The informational individual
For purposes of this paper, we begin with the assumption that biological individuality can be usefully
understood in terms of an informational individual. This is not to be confused with Dawkin’s replicator,
as replication might be inessential to individuality. What is essential is the idea that information can be
propogated forwarded in time, meaning that uncertainty can be reduced over the course of time.
What follows is an attempt to capture coordinated, persistent and stable structures or regularities in an
information theoretic language in order to quantify an hypothetical system’s degree of individuality. It
is our belief that when biologists speak of individuals they are often invoking informational individuals
without always making this assumption explicit. In this way biological individuals can be seen to be a
natural extension of the ideas of Boltzmann and Von Neumann, originating in ideas related to statistical
mechanics and thermodynamics. This helps to build a bridge to statistical physics without reducing or
claiming to explain all the levels at which interesting or improbable biological structure and function are
observed. Our approach is closely related to ideas associated with the concept of autopoiesis developed
by Maturana (Maturana, 1975) who emphasizes the “unity” of a network of processes engaged in self-
production in terms of autonomy, and the application of autonomy to problems of cognition (Maturana,
1980).
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1. The system environment decomposition. Consider a dynamical set of quantiVable measurements that
we coarse grain into components of a system and components of an environment. We seek a way of
establishing whether this partition is justiVable, and whether the individuality concept is relevant.
We wish to allow for a hierarchy of such partitions in order to capture biological examples such as
organelles within cells, and cells within bodies within populations, where in each case the target
entity and the environment assume a diUerent identity. Here we will simplify the problem a bit
by assuming the organism is the environment of the cell and the population is the environment of
the individual organism. The exercise will be to pick arbitrary partitions, and then apply a suitable
criterion for invoking the individuality concept, retaining only those partitions that meet strict
inclusion criteria.
2. Informational individuals. In the pursuit of generality, we consider a discrete, stochastic dynamical
system, where the state of the system in the future is determined by some subset of states in the
present. If we arbitrarily divide these states into system and environment, we should like to be able
to determine how the current system state Sn and the current state of the environment En together
are suXcient to determine the next system state Sn+1. Formally the predictability of the next state
of the system is quantiVed via the mutual information:
I(Sn, En;Sn+1) = H(Sn+1)−H(Sn+1|Sn, En)
This expression seeks to capture how much information at time n+1 Sn+1 comes from the system
itself at a previous time step (or generation) Sn – versus from the environment at a previous time
En. This mutual information can now be decomposed in two ways
I(Sn, En;Sn+1) = I(Sn+1;Sn) + I(Sn+1;En|Sn)
= I(Sn+1;En) + I(Sn+1;Sn|En)
Each decomposition can be interpreted as diUerent ways of distributing the observed past regu-
larities between the system and environment1. Each of these allow us to deVne diUerent forms of
individuality.
a) Genomic determination. Consider I(Sn+1;Sn) + I(Sn+1;En|Sn):
Here we consider the inWuences of the system state onto itself (at the next generation or time
step). For a preferred interval of time, all observed dependencies between successive system
states are attributed to the system only. The environment state appears only in so far as the
environment is inWuenced by prior states of the system. In this case, the future is only a func-
tion of intrinsic mechanisms of heredity in the system and not maintained through interaction
with the environment. The quantity I(Sn+1;Sn) has been called autonomy A
∗. It should be
high when the system is in control of its environment and thus can determine its next state
eUectively.
The remaining inWuence of the environment, as measured by I(Sn+1;En|Sn), can be inter-
preted as new information for the system Wowing from the environment into the system. It is
new to the system in the sense that it cannot already be predicted from the state of the system.
1There are attempts (Williams and Beer, 2010, Harder et al., 2013, Bertschinger et al., 2013) to come up with a Vner decomposi-
tion of the mutual information that would allow to determine which information is shared by the system and the environ-
ment, which information is unique to the system and environment, respectively, and a complementary or synergistic part.
Such a decomposition would resolve the ambiguity in the attribution to either the system or the environment as expressed
by the two interpretations as genomic or environmental determination.
8
When this information Wow vanishes, a system can be said to be informationally closed. So this
quantity measures the degree to which the system is not closed nC . Note that closure does
not require causal independence, it only states that all inWuences from the environment are
predictable by the system.
b) Environmental determination. An alternative to genomic determination is structure imposed
by the environment. Consider I(Sn+1;En) + I(Sn+1;Sn|En):
Here the observed inWuences are attributed to the environment (as far as possible according
to I(Sn+1;En)). Only the remaining inWuence I(Sn+1;Sn|En) is thought to be due to the
system. This can be interpreted as an alternative source of autonomy A for the system. It
should be valid under the assumption that all dependencies between the states of the system
and the environment are attributed to the environment.
Note that even if this is not suggested by the intuition behind the two measures A and A∗, it is
possible that A∗ < A. Such a situation has been called complementary (or synergistic) since it
means that neither the system nor the environment alone predict much about the next system state.
Instead their joint action is required to determine Sn+1. A standard example of this situation would
be the XOR-function in boolean logic.
Thus altogether the following relationship is obtained between the measures of autonomy, depen-
dency and closure
A∗ + nC = A+ I(Sn+1;En)
Interpreting I(Sn+1;En)−nC as a measure of non-trivial closure, since it is large if the system has
information about its environment, but still achieves informational closure (low nC), one obtains
A∗ −A = NTIC (NTIC = non-trivial informational closure)
ReWections on Closure and suXciency
We can think about an individual as a system partition that is a suXcient predictor of its own
future. This means in particular that Sn−1 does not add any information about Sn+1 besides the
one already contained in Sn. Formally this reads as I(Sn+;Sn−1|Sn) = 0.
Note that by the Markovian structure of the system environment interaction
I(Sn+1;Sn, En) = I(Sn+1;Sn−1, Sn, En)
= I(Sn+1;Sn) + [I(Sn+1;Sn−1|Sn) + I(Sn+1;En|Sn−1, Sn)]
= I(Sn+1;Sn) + I(Sn+1;En|Sn)
Thus I(Sn+1;En|Sn) = I(Sn+1;Sn−1|Sn) + I(Sn+1;En|Sn−1, Sn) which means that informa-
tional closure implies suXciency, i.e.
nC = I(Sn+1;En|Sn) = 0 =⇒ I(Sn+1;Sn−1|Sn) = 0
Informational closure is therefore a stronger notion than suXciency2 which allows the system to be
inWuenced by the environment as long as this inWuence cannot be predicted from within the system.
2For a more general setting this was shown in (Pfante et al., 2014).
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Considering longer histories
The above calculations can be generalized to longer histories:
I(Sn+1;Sn, En) = I(Sn+1;S
n
n−l, E
n
n−k)
= I(Sn+1;E
n
n−k) + I(Sn+1;S
n
n−l|E
n
n−k)
= I(Sn+1;S
n
n−l) + I(Sn+1;E
n
n−k|S
n
n−l)
= I(Sn+1;S
n
n−l) + [I(Sn+1;En|S
n
n−l) + I(Sn+1;E
n−1
n−k |S
n
n−l, En)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
]
Thus overall the same relationships between autonomy, closure and suXciency are obtained
I(Sn+1;E
n
n−k) + I(Sn+1;Sn|E
n
n−k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ak
= I(Sn+1;Sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A∗
+ I(Sn+1;S
n−1
n−l |Sn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(non-)suXciency
+I(Sn+1;En|S
n
n−l)
= A∗ + nC
Algorithmic identiVcation of individual boundaries
We have provided formal algorithms that capture an important evolutionary concept of individual-
ity. We now use these algorithms to identify individuals in their environments. The basic idea is to
systematically increase the number of variables that we assign to the target system and determine
whether this procedure leads to an increase in the quantity representing autonomy. If the expansion
of the boundary of the system does not lead to an increase in autonomy, then we have incorporated
an environmental variable needlessly. In this way individuals represent mechanism for aggregating
dynamical processes in such a way as to maximize their knowledge of the future. We can imple-
ment this procedure using both the autonomy and non-closure quantities. If autonomy increases as
we expand our system and non-closure decreases, then we have grounds for the belief that we are
capturing more of the individual by including more processes formerly treated as environmental.
Let us denote the original system with S and the part of the initial environment which becomes the
system by∆S. The remaining environment should be denoted by E′.
• Informational closure
Then we have the two information Wows
nC = I(Sn+1;En|Sn)
= I(Sn+1;E
′
n∆S|Sn)
and
nC ′ = I(Sn+1∆Sn+1;E
′
n|∆Sn, Sn)
Using some algebra we get
nC ′ = nC − I(Sn+1;∆Sn|Sn) + I(∆Sn+1;E
′
n|∆Sn, Sn+1, Sn)
The Vrst term subtracts the information Wow which is now internalized and the second term
adds the Wow which resided previously in the environment. Clearly the system becomes more
closed if the internalized Wow is larger than one included additionally.
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• Autonomy
Let us start with the simpler measure A∗, the mutual information between subsequent states:
A∗ = I(Sn+1;Sn)
and
A′∗ = I(Sn+1∆Sn+1;Sn∆Sn)
= A∗ + I(∆Sn+1;Sn|Sn+1) + I(Sn+1∆Sn+1;∆Sn|Sn) .
Similarly one obtains for the other dependency quantity:
A = I(Sn+1;Sn|En)
= I(Sn+1;Sn|E
′
n∆Sn)
A′ = I(Sn+1∆Sn+1;Sn∆Sn|E
′
n)
= A+ I(Sn+1∆Sn+1;∆Sn|E
′
n) + I(∆Sn+1;Sn|E
′
n∆SnSn+1)
= A+ I(Sn+1;∆Sn|E
′
n) + I(∆Sn+1;Sn∆Sn|E
′
nSn+1)
Both autonomy measures can only grow or stay constant with increasing system size, but they
can never decrease.
SuXciency expansion and boundary detection
We can explore suXciency a little more formally in terms of Markov conditions. We consider
a system as self-suXcient if its dynamics are Markovian, i.e.
I(Sn+1;Sn−m|Sn−1, . . . , Sn−m+1) = 0 .
In the following we consider only the casem = 1:
We get for the non-suXciency nS′ = I(S′n+1;S
′
n−1|S
′
n) of the enlarged system
I(S′n+1;S
′
n−1|S
′
n) = I(Sn+1∆Sn+1;Sn−1∆Sn−1|Sn∆Sn) (1)
Now we apply the chain rule:
I(Sn+1∆Sn+1;Sn−1∆Sn−1|Sn∆Sn) = I(Sn+1∆Sn+1;Sn−1|Sn∆Sn)
+I(Sn+1∆Sn+1;∆Sn−1|Sn−1, Sn∆Sn)
I(Sn+1∆Sn+1;Sn−1|Sn∆Sn) = I(Sn+1;Sn−1|Sn∆Sn) + I(∆Sn+1;Sn−1|Sn∆SnSn+1)
I(Sn+1∆Sn+1;∆Sn−1|Sn−1, Sn∆Sn) = I(Sn+1;∆Sn−1|Sn−1, Sn∆Sn)
+I(∆Sn+1;∆Sn−1|Sn−1Sn∆SnSn+1)
and
I(Sn+1;Sn−1|Sn∆Sn) = I(Sn+1;Sn−1|Sn) + I(Sn+1;∆Sn|Sn−1Sn)
−I(Sn+1;∆Sn|Sn)
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which leads to
nS′ = nS − I(Sn+1;∆Sn|Sn) + I(Sn+1;∆Sn|Sn−1Sn) + I(Sn+1;∆Sn−1|Sn−1, Sn∆Sn)
+I(∆Sn+1;∆Sn−1|Sn−1Sn∆SnSn+1) + I(∆Sn+1;Sn−1|Sn∆SnSn+1)
nS′ = nS − [I(Sn+1;∆Sn|Sn)− I(Sn+1;∆Sn|Sn−1Sn)]
+I(S′n+1;∆Sn−1|Sn+1S
′
n) + I(∆Sn+1;Sn−1|S
′
nSn+1)
We see that the only termwhich can lead to a decrease of the non-suXciency is I(Sn+1;∆Sn|Sn)−
I(Sn+1;∆Sn|Sn−1Sn). It can be interpreted as the internalized information from Sn−1 to
Sn+1.
The other two terms are always positive and related to new information Wows through the
environment – which are made possible by enlarging the system and which are not accounted
for by nS.
Interpretation of information theory of individuality
Using an information theoretic framework applied to a time series we have derived a number of principled
quantities that capture degrees of individuality. The exposition is neccessarily formal as we have sought
to provide a procedure for “discovering” individuals in a variety of diUerent biological contexts. The key
empirical requirement is the careful measurement of a number of hypothesized individual attributes or
properties over the course of time. For example, the abundance of organisms in a population; the genetic
or phenotypic states of cells or tissues over time, the Vring rates of neurons over time. In each case we re-
quire a consistent time series of measurements in an appropriate coordinate frame (concentration, spatial
position, Vring rate, chemical concentration) that provide the input to our algorithms. It is our contention
that many existing biological concepts (e.g.tightly coordinated replicators, developmental individuals),
will be identiVed through this procedure. Many novel “individuals” will also be identiVed, including those
at the societal level that are currently deprecated as derivative or epiphenomenal.
We derived a quantity for autonomy,Awhich measures to what degree the past of a system can predict its
future. Whether we are speaking of the persistence of a cell, an organism, or a personality-type, we have
in mind Vnding that unit of description able to account for some property of that system in the future.
We even use the terms “individualistic" to refer to relative independence from the environment. We only
need to consider what a low autonomy individual entity would look like – uncoordinated in space and
time, with parts that do not work together – to see how critical this value becomes. If systems with high
autonomy are what is meant by individuals, its complement, non-closure nC , when high suggests that we
have found the wrong unit of analysis. We are not dealing with an individual but a collection of poorly
integrated components. This is because the only way to explain a system with a high value of nC is to
invoke everything outside of the system, as this value is precisely the environmental contribution to a
system.
There are occasions however where some complex combination of the system and the environment is
required, and this is the basis of our measure A∗ −A or non-trivial information closure. This is expected
to be high when the individual and the environment enter into complex synergistic relationships. It is
perhaps the notion of individuality best suited to communities of organisms. Each organism will obtain a
high value of A whereas the community or colony will obtain a high value of A∗ − A. In this way these
two measures allow us to distinguish between the individual in the environment versus individuals nested
within super-individuals.
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These individuality-related quantities suggest a natural procedure for identifying the boundaries of the
individual. By incrementally titrating the system/environment boundary (inclusion and exclusion criteria)
we expand the individual to be the largest set of processes which upon further addition is no better
at predicting its future than the previous largest set. For example, if we included not only the motor
system, but metabolism and behavior in our deVnition of an individual organism, our ability to project its
behavior through time would be signiVcantly improved. If we included the limbs of a second individual
or the metabolism of its preferred diet species in the individual, our prediction of the organism is unlikely
to increase. This is not to say that the environment is not important, only that the environment is not
the same as the individual. If the distinction cannot be made, this would be a very intriguing instance of
a non-individualistic dynamical system, as it would imply that there is no favored grouping of processes,
only a random distribution of events through time.
The choice of information theory as a favored theoretical framework allows for great generality but for-
feits mechanism. In this sense the information theoretic theory of individuals is rather like the Darwinian
selection theory that does not rest on any one mechanism of selection, but seeks to explain how selection
can yield skewed distributions of genotypes and phenotypes through time. Both are formal schemes for in-
terpreting a diverse body of data, and seek to provide a coherent framework for analysis and explanation.
An advantage of this approach is that it can provide through logic a common foundation for discussing
a range of nominally distinct observations, and tracing a path from biology to probability theory and
statistical mechanics, helping to build connectivity among biotic and abiotic phenomena.
Hence the more traditional discussions of membranes, self versus non-self, symbiogenesis and the like
have not been treated explicitly. All of these approaches provide the physical basis for the functional
requirements that we have sought to present. Although the theory has nothing to say about mechanism
it is important to realize that it is explicitly motivated by an understanding of the role that mechanism
plays in the consolidation of functional space and time scales and emergence of new function in biological
systems, as discussed in Sec. and in Refs (Gintis et al., 2012, Flack, 2012, Flack et al., 2013)
Caveats and challenges
The purpose of this paper has been to place the discussion of biological individuality on a solid logical and
probabilistic foundation. In order to do so we have taken a fair amount for granted, including the ability to
make accurate measurements at arbitrary scales of granularity and over scales of time that are biologically
meaningful. We have also neglected to discuss those mechanisms that make heredity possible in the Vrst
place, in other words, robustness mechanisms that enable the error-free, or low error, transmission of
information across generations. We have avoided discussing the speciVcs of the functional or selective
beneVts of hierarchical levels, concentrating on their identiVcation. It is fair to assume that long lived
aggregates could develop the capacity to replicate and become a signiVcant target for selection and hence
a bona Vde level at which selection operates, which for some is what is implied by biological individuality
(Okasha, 2006), in which case our approach could provide a means of identifying both pre-individuals
(low autonomy) as well as fully-Wedged individuals (high autonomy). We discuss each of these topics in
more detail below.
1. The partitioning requirement. In the previous discussion we have ‘deVned’ the quantities, auton-
omy, closure and suXciency, in terms of system and environment, but we have not provided any
mechanisms that might generate a time series with appropriate values, or discussed how we might
go about identifying the best system and environmental variables in the Vrst place. Moreover the
choice of time scale will be instrumentally critical, as over very short or very long time scales we
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are unlikely to observe the regularities from which we seek to derive the individuality quantities:
autonomy, suXciency and closure. It is our belief that few of these attributes (system and envi-
ronment variables, time scales etc) can be known in advance, and that it is precisely through the
algorithmic determination of the individual that each will obtain relative support.
2. The robustness requirement. Further to identifying nested or hierarchical partitions, we also require
some speciVcation of the machine itself - the generator of the time series. This will be equated with
parts of the individual and needs to possess some level of robustness or an error-correcting prop-
erty. This is because individuality in adaptive systems often seems to be associated with adaptive
mechanisms of homeostasis – mechanisms that monitor internal states and ensure that deviations
are minimized. It is this self-preserving quality of the individual that allows us to make some useful
discrimination between physical phenomena and biological ones, without exaggerating the dynam-
ical diUerences.
3. The levels of selection. In many previous treatments of individuality, the idea that the individual
has a special evolutionary status has been posited. This is presented in terms of levels of selection,
where coarse-grained aggregates achieve a coordinated persistence property that now allows them
to be treated as segregating, selective units. The most popular formalism for thinking about this
process is presented in terms of the Price equation, which describes how the mean value of a trait
changes as a function of the covariance in that trait and Vtness, and the previous value of the trait.
Of interest to us here is that the Price equation assumes some partition of trait values into groups
and attempts to do this in such a way as to best capture the evolution of the mean value of the
trait in the population. Assuming some true underlying structure and dynamics, the accuracy of
the equation will depend on the choice of partition (Krakauer and Flack, 2010), and our information
theoretic approach could provide such a principled platform for modeling.
Functional implications
Consider the observation that from genomes, to cells, tissues, individuals, societies, and eco-systems, evo-
lution generates structures with nested spatial and temporal levels (e.g., (Feldman and Eschel, 1982, Buss,
1987, Szathmáry and Smith, 1997b, Valentine and May, 1996, Michod, 2000, Gould, 2002, Feldman and Eschel,
1982, Jablonka and Lamb, 2005)). Often with each new structural level there arises new functionality: a
new feature with positive payoU consequences. This new functionality can be present in the form of a
new behavioral output such as a feeding response to a previously inaccessible resource.
Elsewhere we have suggested that a primary driver for the emergence of new functions is the reduction of
environmental uncertainty through the construction of dynamical processes with a range of characteristic
time constants, described using nested slow variables. Slow variables are coarse-grained encodings of fast,
microscopic dynamics. Proteins, for example, have a long persistence relative to RNA transcripts, and can
be thought of as the summed output of translation. Cells have a long persistence relative to protein
turnover rates and are a function of the summed output of arrays of spatially structured proteins. Both
proteins and cells encode some average quantity derived from the noisier activity of their constituents.
Slow variables are useful because they are informative about the future state of the system by capturing
the regular patterns from the past. Hence an appropriate average protein density will be more informative
about the rate of gene expression and RNA translation than any individual measurement of transcription
or translation.
As a consequence of integrating over abundant microscopic processes, slow variables provide better pre-
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dictors of the local future conVguration of a system than the states of the Wuctuating microscopic com-
ponents. As long as there are regularities in the microscopic dynamics, these can be detected by the
system components, and the statistics describing these regularities are available to be computed by the
components when possible. Slow variables can reduce environmental uncertainty and by increasing pre-
dictability promote accelerated rates of microscopic adaptation. The reduced uncertainty facilitates adap-
tation in two ways: It allows components to Vne-tune their behavior and it frees components to search
at relatively low cost a larger space of strategies for obtaining resources from the environment. A related
phenomenon has been studied in relation to neutral networks arising from RNA folding. Many diUerent
sequences can fold into the same secondary structure. This implies that over time, structure changes
more slowly than sequence, thereby freeing sequences to explore many conVgurations under normalizing
selection (Fontana and Schuster, 1998).
We suggest that individuality becomes a functionally signiVcant concept when: (1) some system’s com-
ponents rely to a greater extent on the coarse-grained features of dynamics for adaptive decision-making
than on the detailed and often noisy full microscopic dynamics. And (2) when other processes or systems
interacting with the target system encode only this coarse-grained behavior, or slowly changing coordi-
nated behavior of the target system, and “fail” to see the target system’s microscopic behavior. Ultimately
an individual is a statistically quantized unit of prediction and thereby the elementary constituent of all
adaptation.
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